A SHRED OF EVIDENCE ON THEORIES QF WAGE
STICKINESS*
ALAN S. BLINDER AND DON H. CHOI
A small interview survey was undertaken to see how actual wage-setters would
react to the central ideas of several economic theories of wage stickiness. Wage cuts
were surprisingly prevalent in recent years, despite the booming economy. The
strongest finding was that managers believe that perceptions of fairness play a major
motivational role in labor markets and that a "fair" wage policy is a good deal more
complicated than simply not cutting wages. We also found substantial evidence for
money illusion and against the adverse-selection version of the efficiency wage
model.

Why are wages sticky, especially in the downward direction?
Does the stickiness apply to nominal, real, or relative wages?
Although these questions are central to at least some macroeconomic theories, satisfactory answers have eluded economists for
decades-though not for lack of theoretical effort. Almost a decade
ago, Arthur Okun [1981, p. 9] opined that "the Keynesian wage floor
has been subjected to more Talmudic exegesis than any other
passage in the history of economics." In the intervening years the
theoretical literature on wage rigidity has exploded. By now economists have more theories than they know what to do with.
Empirical research is supposed to discriminate among competing theories; and econometric evidence may eventually eliminate
some theories from contention. Currently, though, it seems to us
that new theories are sprouting up faster than old ones are being
rejected. Part of the problem is that many theories of wage rigidity
rely on unobservable variables and hence are difficult to reject with
the kinds of data that econometricians usually have. With this
problem in mind, we turn in this study to an unconventional type of
data, the sort that economists (alone among social scientists) rarely
use: we actually asked a small sample of wage-setters about the
nature and sources of wage rigidity in their own companies.1
*We are grateful to Orley Ashenfelter, Costas Azariadis, Laurence Ball, Allan
Drazen, Alan Krueger, David Romer, Carl Shapiro, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence
Summers, Richard Thaler, Andrew Weiss, and two anonymous referees for helpful
comments. And we are especially grateful to the managers who participated in-the
survey.
1. Blanchflower and Oswald [1987] report on a large British survey of personnel
managers. Its focus was quite different from ours, however. Our study is closest in
spirit to Kaufman [1984].
1990 by the President and Fellows of HarvardCollege and the MassachusettsInstitute of
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The paper begin with a brief description of the survey design.
Then we summarize the results that bear on several modern
economic theories of sticky wages. As will be seen, the adverseselection model receives rather little support from the survey
results, while models based on costly labor turnover receive more
support. Finally, we report survey results on noneconomic theories
of sticky wages based on the elusive concept of "fairness." It
appears that concern for fairness may have more to do with wage
stickiness than do conventional economic factors such as risk
sharing, shirking, and adverse selection.
We hasten to add that the evidence we offer here, based as it is
on only a small sample, is far from decisive. Nor does it preempt
future econometric work on wage rigidity, which should and will
continue. However, in view of both the difficulty of using econometrics to discriminate among competing theories of wage rigidity and
the paucity of survey data on the subject, we think that even the
shred of evidence we offer here is worth having.
I. THE INTERVIEWS

In March 1988 one of us interviewed either the manager of
compensation or the personnel director of 19 firms in New Jersey
and eastern Pennsylvania.2 Given the small scale of the study, a
stratified random sample of New Jersey industry was out of the
question. Instead, the sample was selected from Ward's Business
Directory of U. S. Firms, which lists companies with annual sales
over $11 million, with two purposes in mind: (a) to approximate the
industrial composition of manufacturing in New Jersey (about 18
percent of employment in the state) and (b) to include some service
firms (another 62 percent of employment) of interest (e.g., a large
insurance company, a telephone company, and a small airline).
In total, 37 companies were approached; of these, 19 agreed to
participate. Our final sample consisted of 13 manufacturing companies ranging in size from 60 to 4,000 employees and six service
companies ranging in size from 150 to 80,000 employees. The
median number of employees was 450, but the mean was 5,767,
reflecting the inclusion of three very large companies. Unionization
rates ranged from zero (in six of the companies) to 90 percent; the
median was 40 percent, and the (weighted) mean was 33 percent.
2. The interviews were conducted by Choi as part of his senior thesis at
Princeton University, which accounts for the geographic concentration.
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Although a fixed outline of questions (see the Appendix) was used
in all interviews, the interviews themselves tended to be free-formlasting as little as 40 minutes or as long as two hours, depending on
how much or how little the respondent chose to elaborate.
One surprising fact that was turned up is that money wage cuts
are more common than we had imagined. Even though our interviews came at a time and place of extremely tight labor markets
(unemployment rates were below 4 percent in many localities), a
sizeable minority of firms had actually reduced wages to at least
some employees in the recent past. Specifically, five of the 19 firms
(26 percent) had recently cut money wages; while four others (21
percent) had reduced fringe benefits, mostly in minor ways. (Some
details on the cuts are given below.) Unless our small sample is
unrepresentative in some important respect, money wage cuts are
more prevalent than many economists (including ourselves) have
supposed.3 It could well be that this wage flexibility is a product of
the 1980s and that less would have been found in a survey in 1978;
we have no way of knowing that.

II. FINDINGS ON ECONOMICTHEORIES OF STICKY WAGES

One well-known theory of wage rigidity holds that less riskaverse firms sell insurance to more risk-averse workers by stabilizing the real wage in the face of fluctuations in the demand for labor.4
Managers were introduced to this theory by the following question:
QUESTION: One theory on why wages do not fall states that workers do not like
unpredictable changes in income. Therefore, workers and employers negotiate a
stable wage that does not tend to fall during recessions or rise during booms. This
steady wage acts as a type of wage insurance for the worker. How plausible or
relevant does this seem as one reason why wages do not fall?

Although the answers took many forms, ten of the 19 managers (53
percent) indicated that they found the idea somewhat "plausible or
relevant."5 Thus, the implicit contract theory bottle is either half
empty or half full, depending on your predisposition.
3. Real wages are even more flexible. Twelve of the 19 firms had reduced real
wages in the recent past by raising money wages less than inflation.
4. The theory originated with Azariadis [1975], Baily [1974], and Gordon
[1974].
5. For present and future reference, it is worth noting that the standard error of
such a percentage in a sample of 19 ranges from about 11 percent (when the true
probability is 50 percent) to about 7 percent (when the true probability is either 90
percent or 10 percent).
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There was much greater consensus on the importance of
relative wages, a point made forcefully by Keynes [1936] and
recently reemphasized by several writers.6 Firms were confronted
with the following question:
QUESTION: One theory on why wages do not fall states that workers are concerned
with how their wages compare to those of other types of workers. Workers want to
maintain a hierarchy of wages for different types of workers, and resist wage
reductions because, unless they are across the board, they will destroy traditional
wage differentials. How plausible or relevant does this seem as a reason why wages do
not fall?

Sixteen of the 19 managers (84 percent) responded that relative
wages are important deterrents to wage reductions. Their answers
were evocative of concern over relative wages, not over what the
wages will buy. Several respondents offered such remarks as
''money is status" or ''we keep score according to how much people
make" or that wage cuts are "ego demeaning."
Responses like that point strongly toward a noneconomic
explanation of wage rigidity, and we shall examine this idea further
in the next section. But they do not rule out conventional economic
explanations, for, as Summers [1988] points out, most versions of
efficiency-wage theory assign a central role to relative wages as well.
We therefore inquired about three different efficiency-wage models:
adverse selection, shirking, and labor turnover.
The adverse-selection model is based on three premises: (1)
that workers differ in productivity; (2) that at least some of these
productivity differences are unobservable; and (3) that unobservable productivity differences are correlated with alternative wages.
If all three premises are true, then lowering the offered wage will
attract an inferior applicant pool.7 Almost all firms (17 of 19, or 89
percent) agreed that there are productivity differences among
workers. However, apparently none of them would interpret a
worker's rejection of a wage offer as evidence that his productivity is
unobservably high. Specifically, managers were asked the following
question:
QUESTION: There are two workers who are being considered for the same job. As
far as you can tell, based on interviews, experience, education, and so forth, both
workers are equally well qualified. One of the workers agrees to work for the wage you
offer him. The other one says he needs more money to work for you. Based on this

6. See Blinder [1988], Summers [1988], and Akerlof and Yellen [1988].
7. See Weiss [1980], among others.
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difference, do you think one of these workers is likely to be an inherently more
productive worker?

Not one of the 18 managers who responded to this question
answered in the affirmative. We view this as damaging evidence
against the adverse-selection model, a model that we had viewed as
plausible on a priori grounds, unless there is a strong asymmetry (so
that higher wages attract a superior applicant pool) or adverse
selection applies only to quits, not to new hires.
Another version of efficiency-wage theory is based on moral
hazard; one form this may take is shirking. Every firm believed that
workers sometimes shirk on the job, which suggests that the theory
holds promise. However, few thought that a higher wage would
motivate greater work effort. When asked, "What are the most
important factors in making an employee work hard?", only two of
the 18 respondents (11 percent) mentioned wages while three others
(17 percent) explicitly denigrated the importance of wages. Nonetheless, when asked a more pointed question-"If you lower wages, do
you believe that employees will work less hard?"-13 of 19 (68
percent) managers answered yes, and two others said that workers
would quit. These seemingly contradictory responses suggest either
that responses to wage increases and decreases are asymmetric or,
as will be seen below, that the response to a wage reduction depends
on the reason for the cut.
The version of the shirking model that has received the most
attention is due to Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]. It holds that there is
less shirking when unemployment is higher because the penalty for
being caught and fired is greater; similarly, when wages fall, the
threat of unemployment becomes less severe, and hence shirking
rises. Every one of the 13 managers who said that a wage cut would
lead to more shirking pointed to reduced morale, not to a decreased
penalty for job loss, as the reason. However, when asked directly
whether higher unemployment would lead to higher work effort
among their workers, 13 of 18 respondents (72 percent) answered
that it would. Depending on your predilections, these results can be
read as either good or bad news for the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.
According to the labor turnover model, and to a considerable
body of empirical evidence, lower wages lead to higher costs from
increased turnover. Of the five firms that had reduced wages in the
8. See Pencavel [1970] or Krueger and Summers [1988].
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recent past, only one reported a significant increase in labor
turnover. Yet, when confronted with the hypothetical question, "If
your firm reduced wages, do you believe the number of people who
quit will increase?", all 18 respondents answered affirmatively.
Once again, however, the reason for the wage cut seemed to matter.
Six managers noted that the justification of the wage reduction was
important to the turnover issue, while eight others mentioned the
importance of wages paid by other firms. Finally, when asked
specifically whether the costs of hiring and training new workers
was one reason not to reduce wages, 11 of 16 respondents (69
percent) said yes. All in all, the survey results seem to support the
idea that fear of labor turnover may deter wage reductions.

III. FAIRNESS AND WAGE STICKINESS

As we noted earlier, several firms said that whether or not a
wage cut would reduce work effort or raise quit rates depends on
how the wage cut is justified to workers. Generally, wage reductions
made to save the firm from failure or to align wages with those of
competitors are viewed as justifiable and fair while those made just
to raise profits are not.9 In this light, it is interesting to see the
circumstances under which money wages were cut in the five firms
that did so. One large manufacturing company, facing declining
demand and paying above-market wages, eliminated incentives and
a cost-of-living clause. Two other manufacturers, also suffering
from slack demand, cut wages temporarily and restored them when
business improved. One manufacturer reclassified some workers
into a lower job category, thereby reducing wages. The one service
company that reduced wages did so for a group of workers that was
being paid above the industry standard.0
Several questions were specifically addressed to the issue of
"fairness." Two hypothetical situations were posed.
In the first, the local unemployment rate was posited to rise two
percentage points at a time of zero inflation. Managers were asked
whether they and their workers would perceive a wage reduction to
9. Of course, in a perfectly competitive market there is no distinction between
wage cuts to avoid bankruptcy and wage cuts to raise profits. We doubt that this
subtlety troubled our respondents. Blanchflower and Oswald [1987] also interpret
their survey evidence as inconsistent with perfectly competitive markets.
10. Note, however, that our only evidence that the companies paying abovemarket wages were in fact doing so comes from the companies themselves. We have
no way of knowing if they were just trying to rationalize wage cuts.
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take advantage of the labor market slack as (a) completely fair, (b)
acceptable, (c) unfair, or (d) very unfair. Responding for themselves, three managers deemed the question irrelevant-the economist's answer, we suppose. Of the remaining 16, all but one (94
percent) said that such a wage cut would be unfair or very unfair.
(The other one called it acceptable.) Answering on behalf of their
workers, however, only one branded the fairness issue irrelevant; all
the others said that their workers would consider such a wage cut
unfair or very unfair.
The next hypothetical situation was identical except that both
wages and prices were stated to be rising initially at 4.4 percent per
annum. Managers were asked about the fairness of reducing the
rate of wage increase. Results obtained by Kahneman et al. [1986]
led us to suspect different answers, reflecting money illusion; and
that is precisely what we found. Seven of the 15 managers who
responded to this question (47 percent) said that reducing real
wages by raising money wages less than inflation was fairer than
cutting money wages when there is no inflation. More importantly,
10 of 17 respondents (59 percent) said their workers would find the
real wage reduction through inflation less unfair than the money
wage reduction. When queried about their different reactions to
real versus money wage cuts, the usual explanation was not that
people do not understand the concept of real wages, but rather that
there is a psychological difference between taking away and not
giving. Of course, to an economist, real wages are being "taken
away" in either case.
Economists will want to know whether a reputation for being
unfair is costly to a firm. So managers were specifically asked how a
reputation for having an unfair wage policy would affect work effort,
quits, and the quality of future applicants. The responses were clear
and unequivocal. Sixteen of 19 (84 percent) said that turnover
would rise; 18 of 19 (95 percent) said that work effort would fall; and
all 19 said that the quality of future job applicants would suffer.
Attitudes like this must be strong deterrents to implementing an
"unfair" wage policy though, as we have seen, that does not
necessarily rule out wage reductions under the right circumstances.
Thus, we reach three conclusions. First, the notion of fairness is
important to the labor market, and there is at least some agreement
among workers and managers about what is fair and what is not.
Second, the common notion of fairness includes a money illusion,
which is what Kahneman et al. found in another context. Third,
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firms believe that a reputation for being unfair will cost them dearly
on the bottom line, as Okun [1981] suggested.
IV. CONCLUSION
The opinions of managers of 19 firms in a geographically
concentrated area hardly constitute the last word on anything. Yet
we believe it is better evidence than introspection by academic
theorists. And at least a few of the results turned up in this survey
are so strong and so uniform that they tempt one to generalize-or
at least to call for further research, including both survey evidence
and econometric testing.
Principal among these is the idea, promoted by Okun [1981]
and Akerlof [1982], that perceptions of fairness play a major
motivational role in labor markets. Furthermore, commonly held
notions of what constitutes a "fair" wage policy are more complicated than merely paying high wages or not cutting wages. They
seem, for example, to include an important element of money
illusion and even to allow money wage cuts under the right
circumstances. The survey results also cast strong doubt on the
empirical validity of the adverse-selection model while supporting
the importance of labor turnover costs as a factor accounting for
wage rigidity. Results on the risk-sharing and shirking models were
less definitive.
APPENDIX: THE INTERVIEWOUTLINE

I. General Employment and Wages
1. In one sentence or two, could you describe the products (services) your firm provides?
2. How many employees does your firm currently have?
For the sake of brevity, in this study the word "wage" will represent
the total compensation to workers, so it includes money wages plus
other benefits such as pensions and insurance.
3. a. Could you describe how your wages have changed over the
past five years?
b. What were the reasons for these changes?
4. a. How does your firm determine the new wage and salary for a
worker when it comes time to make adjustments?
b. How does your firm determine the wage or salary to offer a
new employee?
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5. a. Do you have a set salary structure that provides certain wage
levels for certain job positions?
b. If so, why do you have this structure?
6. Do your wage agreements with workers include specific standards of performance, such as piece quotas or other requirements?
7. a. In the recent past, has your firm ever laid off workers or
reduced the workweek?
b. If so, what were the circumstances?
8. a. In the recent past, has your firm ever reduced wages?
b. If so, was it the money wage, the other benefits, or both, that
were reduced?
c. If one was reduced but not the other, why did you choose to
reduce that component?
d. What were the circumstances leading to the wage reduction?
9. During times of inflation, have there been times when wages in
your firm have risen by less than the inflation rate?
10. a. Right now, could you find capable workers-that is, workers
with similar qualifications and experience to your own-at less than
current wages?
b. In recent history, have you been able to find capable workers
at less than the wages you were paying?
c. If you have been able to find such workers, did you hire
them?
II. Monitoring
1. Is it possible to monitor accurately the average work effort of a
group of workers?
2. Compared to a group of workers, is it easier, harder, or equally
possible to monitor the work effort of an individual employee?
3. If monitoring is possible, can it be done in an objective way
verifiable by employees or a third party?
4. Does the possibility of monitoring depend on the type of worker
involved, for instance, skilled vs. nonskilled?
5. If it is possible to monitor either group or individual work effort,
do you do so?
III. Legislation
1. a. Are any of your workers currently receiving minimum wage,
and if so, how many?
b. If the government were to raise the minimum wage to a point
where you would have to raise the wages of your lowest paid
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employees, would this have any affect on the wages of employees
receiving above minimum wage?
2. If unemployment benefit programs were increased, would the
wages offered by your firm change?
IV. Unions
1. a. What percentage of your employees are unionized?
b. For other firms in your industry, about what percentage of
workers are unionized?
2. a. In your firm, how important are unions in preventing wages
from falling for your union workers? In other words, if there were no
unions, would your wages be any more likely to fall?
b. In your firm, how important are unions in preventing the
wages of your non-union employees from falling? In other words, if
there were no unions, would your wages be more likely to fall?
V. Implicit Contracts
One theory on why wages do not fall states that workers do not like
unpredictable changes in income. Therefore, workers and employers negotiate a stable wage that does not tend to fall during
recessions or rise during booms. This steady wage acts as a type of
wage insurance for the worker. How plausible or relevant does this
seem as one reason why wages do not fall?
VI. Relative Wages
One theory on why wages do not fall states that workers are
concerned with how their wages compare to those of other types of
workers. Workers want to maintain a hierarchy of wages for
different types of workers, and resist wage reductions because,
unless they are across the board, they will destroy traditional wage
differentials. How plausible or relevant does this seem as a reason
why wages do not fall?
VII. Shirking
1. What are ths most important factors in making an employee
work hard?
2. a. Do you believe that some of your workers shirk on the
job-that, in other words, they don't work as hard as they should?
b. Do you think this tendency is more prevalent among certain
types of workers, or is it universal?
c. If a worker is repeatedly caught shirking, what are the
penalties?
3. If unemployment were to rise, what do you think would happen
to the work effort of your employees?
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4. a. If you lower wages, do you think employees will work less
hard?
b. If so, why is this so?
5. a. Does the number of employees working together in a group
affect the average work effort of the individuals in the group?
b. If there is an effect, what are the reasons behind it?
VIII. Adverse Selection
1. a. For a given job, are there productivity differences among
workers?
b. Are these productivity differences accompanied by wage differences?
2. a. Do job applicants ever offer to work for less than the going
rate?
b. If they do, do you hire them?
c. If you do not hire them, what are the reasons?
3. Before a worker starts on the job, how accurately can you predict
his/her productivity?
4. Have you had applicants turn down job offers because they
thought the wage or salary was too low?
5. There are two workers who are being considered for the same job.
As far as you can tell, based on interviews, experience, education,
and so forth, both workers are equally qualified. One of the workers
agrees to work for the wage you offer him. The other one says he
needs more money to work for you. Based on this difference, do you
think one of these workers is likely to be an inherently more
productive worker?
IX. Turnover
1. What are the most common reasons why workers separate from
your firm?
2. a. If your firm has, in the recent past, reduced wages, were there
employees who quit because of this?
b. If so, why did lowering wages cause them to quit?
3. a. Have there been workers who have chosen to quit because
they felt they were being paid too little?
b. If so, have there been more skilled or nonskilled employees
who have quit for this reason?
4. a. If your firm reduced wages, do you believe that the number of
people who quit would increase?
b. How important would the costs of rehiring and training new
employees be as one reason not to reduce wages?
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X. Conceptions of Fairness
1. Let's say that unemployment in your area rises by 2 percent. One
possibility is that you could reduce wages to take advantage of a
larger labor supply. For this question, assume that there is no
inflation.
a. Do you perceive this as: completely fair, acceptable, unfair, or
very unfair?
b. Do you think your workers would perceive this as: completely
fair, acceptable, unfair, or very unfair?
c. Do you think the general public would perceive this as:
completely fair, acceptable, unfair, or very unfair?
d. If there are differences between your perception of fairness
and other peoples' conception of fairness, what are the reasons for
the differences?
2. The actual inflation rate is currently 4.4 percent, and let's
assume that your employees are receiving yearly wage increases of
4.4 percent to keep up with inflation. If unemployment rises by 2
percent, one possibility is that you could reduce the wage increase to
take advantage of a larger labor pool.
a. Do you perceive this as: completely fair, acceptable, unfair, or
very unfair?
b. Do you think your workers would perceive this as: completely
fair, acceptable, unfair, or very unfair?
c. Do you think the general public would perceive this as:
completely fair, acceptable, unfair, or very unfair?
d. If there are differences between your perception of fairness
and other peoples' conception of fairness, what are the reasons for
the differences?
3. If your wage policy is generally considered to be unfair, how will
this affect:
a. the behavior of your customers?
b. the work effort of your current workers?
c. the number of workers who quit?
d. the quality of your future job applicants?
DEPARTMENTOF ECONOMICS,PRINCETONUNIVERSITY
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